Demonstrating why science is our best method of finding out what is true in our objective reality
Throughout the history, philosophers are all bothered regarding to the question of "What is truth" and how can we know it when we see it. The conflict starts when they began butting their heads with each other to show which of their epistemological frameworks that are best in describing reality. Unfortunately, many of those frameworks are problematic and sometimes even absurd. There are also which are incomplete unto themselves, but functional when integrated into another. It shows the efforts of intellectuals to formulate a workable model of describing reality despite of our fundamental disconnection to it. Remember that there may be some absolute objective reality out there, but the simple fact is that we cannot know it with absolute certainty.
Let's go back to the word "truth"
Bear in mind that when it comes to speaking about something like truth, it's not about some intrinsic metaphysical entity that exists in reality, but a label that you slap on a proposition in accordance to a well-specified rules. Propositions can either be true or false, but there's simply no such thing as the raw "essence" of truth interwoven into the fabric of space-time continuum. You give me a proposition like "All bachelors are unmarried," or "Socrates is a man," or "Liquid is a phase of matter," then I will mark them by using a binary set that contains the elements "true" and "false" which is known as truth value. Now what is the algorithm that we are using to map those propositions to their assigned truth value? We call that as truth assignment function (or sometimes called truth valuation or truth interpretation) (1). It is a mapping function comprised of rules between the set of linguistic propositions and the set of binary truth values. It is the process within a certain epistemology that determines the truthiness of a given assertion. To visualize, truth assignment function more or less look like this:
To make it more complicated, how about we combine propositions? Maybe you think that two true propositions connected into one sentence should also be assigned to its truth value as "true," or maybe two false statements that are disconnected to each other should also be labeled as "false," or maybe you also think that a true proposition must always be true while its negative counterpart should always be false. These are all valid operations and we are using logical connectives to connect these propositions to each other, therefore creating more propositions (2). These things are bound by a major branch of logic known as propositional logic (deals with studying ways how to combine and/or modify propositions to form more complicated propositions) (3).
When it comes to truth values, no one is actually forcing us to stick with a binary set that only composes of true and false, and there are some alternatives sets of truth values out there that is also used by scientists, engineers, and mathematicians. Maybe you think that truth would make more sense if we add another element in a truth value like U, which means "unknown" or "undefined" or "neither" or "incoherent" or "maybe," which known as ternary logic or three valued logic (4); or maybe you think that truth is more like a continuum value instead of a discrete set of values, where 1 means true, 0 means false, and everything in between like 0.2, 0.5, 0.6, or 0.9 as partially true or partially false. This is known as fuzzy logic (5).
This seems to be alright so far until one question pops up: how the hell can we apply this to reality? Given that we already had the ability to formulate linguistic propositions and to manipulate truth values, but how can we assign those truth values to the propositions? What are the rules that are we going to use? Remember that all we did last time was to clarify definitions and to clear out misconceptions about the nature of truth, but we still yet to define an ideal truth assignment function that is functional and reliable (See the article Why Apologists Don't Know What Truth Really Means). At best, we only seem to have this obscure idea that truth, in some way of another, should represent a "correspondence" between a set of propositions and the set of actual things in objective reality. That is to say, true propositions correspond with reality while false ones do not. Yes, we are going back to the Correspondence Theory of Truth.
Revisiting the problem of external world skepticism
We already talked about how this way of assigning truth to propositions seems to be pretty intuitive at first glance, until you see a glaring hole into it, namely, what exactly does "correspondence" mean, and how can I recognize it when I see it? How can I know if true propositions indeed correspond with actual reality? And as I've also already said, we can't know it! And that is because of the philosophical problem of external world skepticism. That is to say, whatever sense-experience that are you perceiving at any given situation, there will always be a lot of ad hoc explanations for what might be causing it. Our desire to perceive absolute objective reality is unachievable because of our limited cognitive capacity. Even if it is the case that I can perfectly perceive reality, how exactly would I correspond the linguistic propositions to those actual state of affairs? What are the rules that I need to follow and how do I apply them? The fundamental borders between actual reality, our capability of perceiving that reality, and our linguistic framework that we use for describing that reality, cannot simply be ignored. This is the part where philosophers begin to dash their heads and disagree with each other, regarding of what is the ideal truth assignment function that we should use, and the precise nature of it. Fortunately, there are some general principles out there that many people tend to agree on.
Truth assignment functions: incorrigible propositions
Consider the principle of mental incorrigibility, or truths by sense-experience, or simply, empiricism; and from this, we generate incorrigible propositions. It simply means that any honest proposition about one's immediate sensory perception is always true, by default. For example, "I hear music," or "I see color green," or "I feel a pain in my left leg." These propositions do not describe anything about the external reality but just using words to describe the reality in our immediate sensory perception. It doesn't matter if these perceptions are false or illusory, as long as you are being honest about what you are saying. Maybe I see green but it's actually red because I'm color blind, or maybe I feel pain on my left leg but I'm amputated and just having a phantom limb syndrome. Despite of that, it's still undeniable that I'm experiencing it, so I formulate linguistic propositions from it, then label it as "true." Bear in mind that I'm just describing a sensation in my own internal reality and it says nothing about the external reality. But religious people, especially Christians, have historically tried to abuse this principle by proving the existence of their god by squeezing him into an incorrigible proposition. They might say something similar like "I know God exists because I feel him in my heart," or "I know God exists because I've experienced the self-authenticating witness of the Holy Spirit," which is very much alike with the William Lane Craig quote in the essay The Importance of the God Arguments, or "I know God exists because I always feel his presence whenever we're having a worship service." They love to say these statements because there's literally no way to refute an incorrigible claim, but if you dig deeper, you will notice that this is just another kind of fallacy. It's about confusing the distinction between internal and external reality. To say that you are experiencing "God's love in your heart," all that it means is that you are having a deep, emotionally-arousing sensation that is distinct from others. Then you give that sensation a label, and you label it as "God." To assert something like "I feel God" is not that different than to say "I smell coffee" or "I feel itchy," and it's nothing more than a certain sensory perception that being given a label. It says nothing about the actual existence or properties of any entities in the real world.
Moreover, another kind of incorrigible propositions are the usage of labels, definitions, substitutions, or symbolic notations, because it's just about describing my immediate sensory awareness using language. Examples are "I define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'," or "I call this feeling 'love'," or "Let '=' be a substitute for 'is equal to'," or "Let A=B and B=C." Remember that it's just using language to describe thoughts, perceptions, and experiences, and other people are not necessarily obligated to use my convention whenever they express their own ideas. So no matter how good you are at using scientific and philosophical jargon, if your interlocutor doesn't understand you, for them, you're just speaking other language. If you want your conversation to go somewhere, make sure that other people can follow your use of linguistic framework.
Truth assignment functions: axiomatic and definitional propositions
Another known method of assigning truths to propositions is using the principle of axiomatic formalism or truths by definitions or we can simply call it, rationalism; and from this, we formulate axiomatic assertions. It means that there are certain propositions that are deemed to be "obviously true" by rote fiat, known as axioms. Axioms are propositions that is always taken to be true or self-evidently true that no one is seriously disputing it. These are often used in almost every field of mathematics, especially algebra. Take the example of reflexive property of equality which says A=A. This is not derived from any logical framework nor empirically discovered somewhere, it's just outright labeled as "true" in order for mathematicians to have a concept of equality in formulating a functional system of algebra. Then once you have an agreeable set of axioms, you can now generate new true propositions from this, using the rule of inference, like the transitive property of equality which says that if A=B and B=C, then A=C, and this process is similar to simple deductive logic. Another one is the symmetric property of equality which says that if A=B, then B=A. By generating more new propositions using the rule of inference, we can derive theorems (propositions derived from chain of axioms), which are the very core behind all mathematical and propositional logic. Examples are the Pythagorean Theorem, Bayes' Theorem, and Fundamental Theorem of Algebra.
It all may seem a kind of circular, well yes, at first glance but actually no. Because contrary to the popular misconceptions, systems who are purely axiomatic in nature such as logic and mathematics, like incorrigible propositions, doesn't also say anything about objective external reality, but nothing more than definitions. Axioms are more like a highly formalized language that we use as a tool for conveying our thoughts and ideas, therefore good axiomatic assertions are not circular but definitional. Now what if someone out there just asserted that God is an axiom since his existence is self-evidently true that no one seriously questions it? Again, axioms doesn't work that way, because it doesn't say what is or what is not out there in the external reality.
Introducing the analytic and synthetic propositions
Axiomatic assertions and incorrigible propositions are all examples of an analytic proposition (propositions whose truth values are determined by the definitions and rules inherent to our use of language itself), because they are ultimately derived from the raw meaning that we implement on the terms themselves and not from anything from the external world. One can also call as an a priori assertion. Statements like "All bachelors are unmarried," or "All dogs are mammals" are all analytical and 100% certainly true because we define bachelor as an "unmarried man" and we classify dogs as "mammals." Hell, we can even prove the famous "I think, therefore I am" statement of Rene Descartes. "I think" is an incorrigible proposition that describes a distinct experience, therefore it's true; then we have an analytic proposition that things that think must also exist and we arbitrarily defined it to be "being"; and "therefore I am" now is a deductive statement that used the rule of inference, deriving a new true proposition from two previous premises. Surprise! Now it's 100% certain.
Now what about those propositions that do actually attempt to describe the objective external reality beyond of our mental processes and apart from mere definitions? We call that as synthetic propositions, or a posteriori assertions, where statements like "All bachelors are white people," and "All dogs are furry" belongs. Unlike analytic propositions that can be proven by definition, synthetic ones need empirical evidence from the real world to prove it. But the problem is how do we do that? If only we can just pop open a can of objective reality and perceive the fact directly, but we can't. Our sense are fundamentally disconnected to it and it cannot be known with an absolute 100% certainty. What do we do? Also, keep in mind that there is no absolute epistemology that binds all people across space and time and anyone is free to choose their own rules and principles in assigning truths to their propositions. Therefore many kinds of truth assignment functions keep popping out there from many hack philosophers or maybe some idiot talking in streets.
For example, what if I decide to assign synthetic truths to propositions that reinforce my sense of personal identity and social status, and let's call it egotistical validation. Every propositions that makes my public image and status look good must therefore be true, and otherwise are false. Anything that offends me and hurts my feeling are false too. This truth assignment function is often even used in religious and political discussions, especially by public figures where reputation is important and personal emotions tend to increase highly. Another one, how about I decide that no synthetic propositions are true if they contradict the Bible? That is to say, it is true if the Bible says so. It's called biblical inerrancy. This kind of truth assignment is actually pretty common, since there's a lot of Christian fundamentalists out there who interprets the Bible as literally true.
Introducing pragmatism
But hey, let's face it: these kinds of truth assignments are obviously arbitrary, useless, and completely unsatisfying because they totally make no efforts to connect our beliefs philosophically with any objective sense of reality beyond our internal senses. Any kind of truth assignment systems will be meaningless unless we can find a way to overcome the external world skepticism that nature imposed to us. Therefore, it is the reason why so many philosophical debates seems to be pointless. In addition, these either needlessly arbitrary, blatantly self-serving, or intentionally stupid truth assignment functions also seem to overlook one of the most fundamental question about beliefs: Why is it so important for us to accept as many true propositions as we can and reject false ones at the same time? Seriously, why bother believing anything at all? What's the point? Consider this thought experiment: what if I told you that I'm a wizard that studies in Hogwarts? I believe that I'm a Ravenclaw wizard that can cast spells, charms, and curses using a magic wand and I can fly with a broomstick, and you will believe me, right? Of course not, you're a skeptic and you will disagree with me. Maybe you say that I'm just a delusional Potterhead that my obsession with Harry Potter just got out of hand. Or maybe you just ask me to prove my claim, and then I say to you that magic spells are not allowed in the Muggle world or some kind of other ad hoc excuses. And you are still not convinced as expected and you say, "You're not a wizard, stop being delusional," for which I reply, "No! I'm a wizard and no one can change my mind!" I therefore concluded based on my sense of epistemology that I'm a wizard and you concluded based on your epistemology that I'm not a wizard.
So what do we do? Who's right and who's wrong? Remember that neither of us can just pop open a can of absolute objective reality and settle this debate with perfect certainty, because you have your own ways to assign truths to propositions and I have mine too. There's simply no absolute epistemology out there. So what's next? Is it the end of story? Well no, because in the real world, no one just assert something as true and then just leaves it at that. Sooner or later, people will tend to act based on those beliefs. So if I really believe that I can cast spells out of my wand, you will then challenge me to levitate something in the air, for example, or challenge me to light up a fire using my wand. If my beliefs are true, then I can just swish and flick my wand and shout "Wingardium Leviosa," pointing to a piece of paper and it will indeed, float; or I can just shout "Incendio," pointing to that same piece of paper, then it will burn. However, if my beliefs are false, then I would fail to achieve that goal. Another example, why would I bother be stuck in a traffic jam if I could just use my broomstick and fly away like I'm competing in a Quidditch match? If there's any reality behind my proposition that "I can fly using my broomstick," then I should reasonably expect flight; but if not, then I would just jumping with a broomstick in between my thighs, looking like a lunatic moron that needs a psychiatric help due to Harry Potter obsession.
The whole point of believing anything at all is for us to use it as a guide for our actions, decisions, and behavior. This point is so important to our sense of epistemology that we can even go so far as to say that "synthetic truth is meaningless if it's not somehow tied to our actions." Let me ask you another question: who would win in a fight, Batman or Iron Man? I mean, they are both rich, intelligent, and they are both good at fighting, and they both have very cool gadgets and technology. Or which would win in a fight, the Starship Enterprise (from Star Trek) or an imperial Star Destroyer (from Star Wars)? Consider my two questions and think about it. Sure, we can waste time arguing about which one of them will win and never agree with each other, as a lot of nerds from Marvel/DC and Star Wars/ Star Trek fandom are doing. Maybe you can provide rational deductions, or comics and movie references to prove your side, but seriously, WHO GIVES A SHIT??? Why would I even bother to care who's between Iron Man and Batman would win a fight? The only way to settle this debate objectively is to challenge Tony Stark and Bruce Wayne to fight each other and watch what will happen. But how can we suppose to do that if Iron Man and Batman are derived from purely fictional worlds of Stan Lee and Bob Kane?
Consider another question: "How many angels can dance on the head of a pin?" (6) This is actually a serious riddle that plagued the minds of Christian scholastic philosophers like Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas during the Medieval Period, and they actually spent hours and hours of debates over this matter. How can they even try to argue over the truth of that proposition if it is impossible to verify it in the first place? No matter what answer you will give about that question, nothing will happen and there will be no decision that you will ever make can ever be influenced by the answer to that question. If it becomes impossible to verify truth claims, then it will also be philosophically impossible to objectively distinguish a true claim from a false claim. There's simply no longer a difference. Truth therefore loses all its meaning and relevance if it doesn't have the capacity to exercise decisions and actions and to observe the outcomes. The reason why we bother believing anything at all is for us to use those beliefs to dictate our actions and decisions, then those actions will influence the events in the external world, and those events lead to objective consequences. Remove any of these elements, and truth immediately become irrelevant and worthless. To make it short: BELIEFS INFORM ACTIONS, ACTIONS HAVE CONSEQUENCES, CONSEQUENCES ARE OBJECTIVE. Notice that although we cannot know objective external reality with 100% certainty, this principle seems to at least approximate to that goal. If we all really think that external reality is universal and absolute, then we should expect that our same decisions made under same conditions will lead to same outcomes. If we all believe that gravity is real and jumping 20 feet in the air will kill us, then we should expect that jumping 20 feet in the air simultaneously will lead us all to fall from our deaths.
This principle is known in philosophy as pragmatism, a school of thought that was introduced in the United States of America during the 19th century by philosophers Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. All that this principle says is that the ultimate measure of every true or false propositions lie in their capacity to produce results, i.e. its practical application. If my certain belief is true, then what can I do with it? What decisions and actions can I now make in the real world with real objective predictable consequences, and what would be the difference if my belief turned out to be false instead? Which brings us to the pragmatic maxim that was first expressed by Charles Sanders Peirce in his article in Popular Science Monthly Volume 12 on 1878 (7). What he means in this maxim is that whatever principles that you use to assign truths to your propositions, this should be the ultimate goal that they must serve.
"It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension is as follows: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." - Charles Sanders Peirce (Illustrations of the Logic of Science: How to Make Our Ideas Clear, page 293)
All that it says is that the ultimate arbiter of a true synthetic proposition is its capacity to inform decisions under the expectation of desirable outcomes. Decisions that are based on true beliefs will therefore manifest themselves in the form of controlled, predictable experience, while decisions based on false beliefs will eventually fail to achieve that goal.
In his book Philosophy of Science, philosopher Alexander Bird has a better variation on how to explain pragmatism (8). Although he's talking about a reliabilist epistemology, this seems to also work as a pragmatic maxim as well:
"N has a desire (D). N has a belief (B) that doing action (A) will achieve desire (D). If belief (B) is true, then N's doing A will achieve D." - Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science)
This syllogism addresses a question, that is "How do I know a true belief when I see it?" If your belief simply fails to achieve a desirable outcome by acting on it, then there's clearly something wrong. Now let's refine this maxim and transform it into something like this: For any synthetic proposition (P), there exists an action (A) and expected consequence (C) to that action. If P is true, then doing A will lead to C. If doing A fails to produce C, then P is false. Using this, let's now give an example:
Notice that the principles of mental incorrigibility and axiomatic formalism are still vital in utilizing pragmatism. They are not mere ends unto themselves, but one of the important tools for navigating the world and to measure synthetic truths based from it, is through our incorrigible awareness of our internal reality. That's why philosophers are wasting their time whenever they are debating about whether which of empiricism and rationalism are the more reliable framework of determining what is real. Those two school of thoughts, together with pragmatism, are useful tools and works together in harmony. The great thing about the pragmatic principle is that everyone is bound by it whether they consciously know it or not. No matter what kind of epistemology that you think is right, you still cannot deny the fact that we all experience sensory perceptions, we exercise decisions, we can observe its outcomes, and we can observe that some of those outcomes are desirable or not. Moreover, it doesn't even need to be perfect, only functional. It doesn't necessarily mean that empirical predictability is enough or sufficient to say that a synthetic proposition is true, but it is a necessary criterion of determining whether those kind of propositions are indeed true.
To further emphasize the point, let's get into another thought experiment: suppose that you are in a pedestrian lane on a busy intersection and you are about to cross to the other side. You believe that it is okay to cross on a road even though it is not yet in "Go" signal as long as there's no vehicle that is passing by. Sure, you can formulate premises and logical deductions to support your belief, but sooner or later, you are going to translate that belief in action. No matter how smart you think your arguments are, it would be still be wrong if your belief fails to achieve your expected desirable outcome. Therefore everyone, everywhere is universally bound to this similar pragmatic process in our daily epistemology. In order to do this process, we need to collect empirical data through our senses, formulate it as a rational descriptive model of objective reality with the help of language and logic, act accordingly on our decisions, and then empirically observe the consequences. It is the reason why pragmatism is the only epistemology so far with the capacity of "connecting" us to the external reality beyond our senses. Because even if our entire reality is just a grand illusion caused by some kind of a matrix simulation or a demon-spawned hallucination, then even that kind of reality is still real in objective sense and obviously operating according to causally predictive patterns. It doesn't matter if we are just brain-in-a-vat, as long as our reality has a reliability to produce the same effective results, we can confidently say that it is true. If our actions have influence on the outcome of future events, then we can use those outcomes to gain real information about the rules that governs our reality. It is because beliefs drive actions, actions have consequences, and consequences are objective. As long as it works, it's fine.
We can name this process as pragmatic empirical rationalism, but if you think about it, there's actually a much shorter name for it: SCIENCE! That's all it is, science! If you dig it to its most fundamental level, science is all about a formalized systematic process of gathering empirical information, expressing it with a rational, predictive framework, and testing those predictions against quantifiable actions and consequences.
How and why the scientific method works?
"If you base medicine on science, you cure people. If you base the design of planes on science, they fly. If you base the design of rockets on science, they reach the moon. It works, bitches." - Richard Dawkins
The reason why we like basing our beliefs through the scientific method is because it ultimately allows us to make real decisions in the real world with real empirical consequences. You can also see that this pragmatic principle implicitly captures and utilized many known scientific principles.
"There is no other species on the Earth that does science. It is, so far, entirely a human invention, evolved by natural selection in the cerebral cortex for one simple reason: it works. It is not perfect. It can be misused. It is only a tool. But it is by far the best tool we have, self-correcting, ongoing, applicable to everything. It has two rules. First: there are no sacred truths; all assumptions must be critically examined; arguments from authority are worthless. Second: whatever is inconsistent with the facts must be discarded or revised. We must understand the Cosmos as it is and not confuse how it is with how we wish it to be." - Carl Sagan (Cosmos)
One example is the principle of fallibility or fallibilism, which states that no synthetic propositional model can ever be labeled as true with perfect universal certainty. That is to say, no matter how smart you think your theory is, you must always consider the possibility that you are wrong. That's just a simple fact of life, everyone do mistakes, and every epistemological model have flaws. The best thing that we can do is to know what to expect from those models if and when we ever happen to encounter them. Therefore, every claim of knowledge must always be open to possible revision if ever we face any better and newer information in the future. All scientific theories, and by extension, all synthetic propositions, are at best, tentative. Another one is the principle of falsifiability that was first introduced by Karl Popper which states that any propositional models that fail to produce results or predict consequences are certainly false. Even though we cannot know with absolute certainty what theories are true, we can be confident about what are the false ones.
Because both true and false propositions can generate decisions and actions with desirable consequences, but only false beliefs can produce undesirable outcomes. In order for a proposition to be considered as scientific, there must be a possibility for some kind of a test that would disprove it. If a synthetic proposition cannot be falsified, it is reasonable to reject it and to deem it as a valueless proposition. That's why we say that scientific theories are being accepted by the scientific community, not because they are proven to be true in any philosophical sense, but they are accepted because they survived many critical and rigorous attempts of being disproved. Theories like the the Theory of Evolution, the Big Bang Theory, and the Germ Theory of Disease are accepted because they survived many falsification attempts. These theories might be fundamentally flawed in themselves, and might got some things wrong, but at least they are approximate to what actually is in the objective reality. Now, we also have the principle of parsimony, or also known as the Occam's Razor, named after medieval philosopher William of Ockham. It states that given a two or more competing hypotheses or propositional models that makes the same predictions, one should select the solution with the fewest assumptions. In other words, the simplest solution is most likely to be the right one. In science, since anyone can always fix the failing hypotheses with ad hoc excuses and explanations in order to prevent them from being falsified, simpler theories are therefore more preferable than the complex ones since they are more testable.
"No amount of experimentation can ever prove me right; a single experiment can prove me wrong." - Albert Einstein
"It doesn't matter how beautiful your theory is. It doesn't matter how smart you are. If it disagrees with experiment, it's wrong." - Richard Feynman
"In so far as a scientific statement speaks about reality, it must be falsifiable; and in so far as it is not falsifiable, it does not speak about reality." - Karl Popper
"There are many hypotheses in science which are wrong. That's perfectly alright; they're the aperture to finding out what's right." - Carl Sagan
Because of these scientific principles, this makes science as our best method of determining how objective reality works. Because it's a self-correcting process. No other epistemological framework corrects scientific errors other than science itself. And don't you ever dare to call that as circular reasoning, because it's not, it's self-consistency. If a belief or a theory works, then great. If it fails to work, then oh well, it's already discarded, and we'll just formulate something more workable. That's why apologists are wrong whenever they claim that "You can't trust science because it changes it mind repeatedly," or "You have faith in science," or "Science is a belief system." Science is a method. It's something that you do, it's something that you use to test whether your synthetic claims have empirical predictability or not. This is also the reason why the idea of supernatural is rejected by the scientific community. Because the supernatural is, by definition, cannot be empirically verified, cannot be observed, cannot be tested, cannot be falsified, and consistently fails to produce empirical predictions under the expectation of desirable outcomes. It has literally nothing to offer. It's different from saying that the supernatural does not exists, it's just that the idea itself doesn't mean and produce anything.
"Pragmatism is flawed! Just because it works for you doesn't mean it's true." This is a obvious misinterpretation of how pragmatism works. It's not just about what personally works to someone, but what seems to consistently work for everyone else. It doesn't say that truth is equivalent to usefulness, it's just that empirical predictability must be a necessary component of determining synthetic truths. You don't need to have to say that a proposition is true if it's useful or practical, but in order for a belief to produce practical applications, it must have at least an approximation to truth. It doesn't have to be perfectly correspondent to reality, since that's inaccessible, but at least only closer to it, and as long as it doesn't fail to produce expected desirable consequences.
Conclusion
So let me ask you this, do you agree with the scientific pragmatic principle? The choices here are either you agree that synthetic truths should be measured by its capacity to inform decisions and produce results, or you don't. If yes, even in a partial scale, then we can finally have a serious discourse, and if happens that we disagree on some propositions about objective reality, then we can make some verifiable predictions according to our beliefs, then watch what will happen. However, if your answer is no, and the moment that you rejected pragmatism, that synthetic propositions do not have any bearing whatsoever on our capacity to exercise real decisions in the real world with real consequences, then your beliefs simply don't matter anymore. If the best thing that you can do is to give me a bunch of irrelevant gibberish arguments blathered out on the ether, then I don't care anymore.
Well maybe you think pragmatism is a bad truth assignment principle and it should be replaced by a much better framework. But let's face it, without some ultimately pragmatic purpose to measure our beliefs, then those beliefs are effectively irrelevant from any empirically predictive actions and decisions that we can ever hope to make. No one cares how many angels can dance on a head of a pin, or whether who's between Batman or Iron Man will going to win in a fight, because even though I could accept all of the trivial and vacuous arguments about them, and literally nothing changes as a result. Your synthetic truth assignment function is by definition and admission, worthless and irrelevant, if I cannot facilitate my desire to solve actual problems and reliably predict the consequences of my actions. Therefore, pragmatic empirical rationalism/scientific method is the ultimate arbiter of any single synthetic philosophical truth.
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Date Published: June 27, 2020
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